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THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED IN A CRIMINAL
CASE NOT TO BE COMPELLED TO BE A
WITNESS AGAINST HIMSELF.*
MoSE E. BOIABSKY**
Closely connected to the question just considered is that
of the right to compel the accused to exhibit himself for
identification. In People v. Gardner... the court acting
within its discretion, compelled the accused to stand up for
the purpose of identification, and this was held not to be in
violation of the constitutional provision against compelling
one to be a witness against himself. It has been held that
for this purpose a defendant can be compelled to disclose
only those parts of her person which are not usually cov-
ered.'22 The decisions on the question of compelling the
defendant to exhibit himself for comparison with evidence
introduced at the trial are in direct conflict. The identifi-
cation of a prisoner raises the question whether or not the
court may order any inspection of the bodily features of
the accused? In State v. Jacobs,"2' the court said: "A
judge has not the right to compel a defendant in a criminal
prosecution to exhibit himself to the inspection of the jury,
for the purpose of enabling them to determine his status as
a free negro." In State v. Garrett.4 the same court per-
mitted evidence as to the condition of the accused's hands,
the court distinguishing this case from the Jacob's Case
thus: "In this case, not the prisoner, but the witnesses,
were called upon to prove what they saw upon inspecting
the prisoner's hands," so that the court permits circum-
stances tending to show the guilt of the accused to be
proved, although they were brought to light by testimony
*This is the second installment of a thesis on "The Right of the Accused
in a Criminal Case". The first installment appeared, in the December, 1928,
number of the West Virginia Law Quarterly.
*LL.B., West Virginia University, 1928, Charleston, West Virginia.
121 144 N. Y. 119, 38 N. E. 1003 (1894); accord, People v. Ferns, 27
Cal. App. 285, 149 Pac. 802 (1915).
122 State V. Height, 117 Ia. 650, 91 N. W. 935 (1902) ; Thornton v.
State, 117 Wis. 338, 93 N. W. 1107 (1903); State v. Nordstrom, 7 Wash.
506, 510, 35 Pac. 382 (1893); but see State v. Ah Chuey, 14 Nev. 79
(1879).
123 5 Jones (N. C.) 259 (1857).
124 71 N. C. 85, 87 (1874).
1
Boiarksy: The Right of the Accused in a Criminal Case Not to Be Compelled t
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1929
RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED IN A CRIMINAL CASE 127
inadmissible per se; but in Blackwell v. State 25 it was held
that, the place where a prisoner's leg was amputated being
a material point, it was erroneous to require him to stand
up and show his leg, so that a witness could see and de-
scribe it to the jury. But in Ali Chuey's Case"' the court
compelled Ah Chuey, against his protest, to roll up his
sleeve, and show tattoo marks on his arm. Even this case,
however, limited the exposure to situations short of offen-
sive or indecent exhibits.
Is a prisoner compelled to testify against himself when
he is made to take his shoes and place them in tracks?
There is a conflict of authority on this point.'27 It is im-
proper to force the accused to make foot tracks for com-
parison,"' but an examination of defendant's foot to see if
they fitted tracks, is held permissible.2
It should be observed that in the Ah Chuey Case, the
court stated concerning the Jacobs Case: "It is a notice-
able fact that in none of the subsequent cases in that state
(North Carolina), where the Jacobs Case was cited, have
the Courts sanctioned * * * or in any manner approved of
the first reasoning upon which the decision was based."
However the cases have been compared, 30 and it is pointed
out that in none of the later cases decided by the North
Carolina court' 3 was the Jacobs Case overruled, and some
of the cases distinguished it."'
The rule, in England, compels a person whose hand-
writing is in dispute to write in the presence of the judge
so that the writing may be compared with that in litiga-
tion. 33  Statutes to reach the same result have been
adopted in the United States, and the accused in criminal
125 67 Ga. 76 (1881)'.
12 14 Nev. 79 (1879).
127 People Po. Wormer, 175 N. Y. 188, 67 N. E. 299 (1903); State v.
Griffin, 124 S. E. 81 (S. 0. 1924).
128 Cooper v. State, 86 Ala. 610, 6 So. 110 (1888).
129 Lipes v. State, 15 Lea 125, 128 (1885) ; accord, Magee v. State, 92
Miss. 865, 46 So. 529 (1908).
13o 28 L. R. A. 703.
131 State v. Woodruff, 67 N. C. 89 (1872) ; State v. Tiohnson, 67 N. C. 55
(1872); State v. Garrett, supra, n. 124.
132 See the forcible dissenting opinion of Leonard. J., in State v. Ah
Chuey, supra, n. 126.
as WHARToN, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, 10th ed., p. 114; Doe Ex. Dem. Devine
v. Wilson, 10 Moore, P. C. C. 502.
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cases has been compelled by the court to prepare speci-
mens of his handwriting for submission to the jury."'
Another line of cases deals with the compulsory speaking
or repetition of certain words to enable the defendant's
voice to be identified. This has been permitted"' where the
accused has waived his privilege, but a recent Pennsylvania
case prohibited this practice. This would seem to be cor-
rect, since here words are used for assertions of evidentiary
facts.
In conclusion it is pertinent to justify the courts' rulings
which admit evidence of identification against the accused.
Wigmore contends that "What is obtained from the ac-
cused by such action is not testimony about his body, but
his body itself."3' "The prohibition of compelling a man
in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a pro-
ibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to ex-
tort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body
as evidence when it may be material.""13
A New York Statute"8 made it incumbent upon the
operator of a motor vehicle, knowing that injury had re-
sulted from the operation of such vehicle, to report his
name and license number to the injured person or to the
police. A case".9 arising under the statute held that the
legislative action was violative of the constitutional pro-
vision providing that no person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be -a witness against himself. The dissent-
ing opinion"' in the appellate decision, stated: "The stat-
ute does not relate to a criminal prosecution. * * * Whether
a person causing an injury * * * is guilty of crime depends
upon other provisions of law. * * * If no crime was coi-
mitted when the accident occurred * * * the constitutional
provision could have no application, and the defendant's
134 Bradford v. People, 22 Colo. 157, 43 Pae. 1013 (1896); Smith v.
King, 62 Conn. 515, 26 Atl. 1059 (1893); U. S. v. Mullaney, 32 Fed. 370
(1887).
135 Johnson P. Commonwealth, 115 Pa. 369, 9 Atl. 78 (1886) ; Common.
wealth v. Valerso, 273 Pa. 213, 116 Atl. 828 (1922).
136 WIOROn, §2265.
"7 Holt v. U. S., 218 U. S. 245, 252 (1910).
138 Laws 1910, ch. 374, §290 (3).
139 People v. Rosenheimer, 70 lise. Rep. 433, 128 N. Y. S. 1093 (1911),
affirmed in People v. Rosenheimer, 130 N. Y. S. 544 (1912).
'to By Ingraham, P. J.
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constitutional provision was not infringed." The same
question arose in another jurisdiction" under a similar
statute'42 which gave a result contra to that reached in the
New York cases. The court justified its conclusion thus:
"Common observations and experience show that un-
restricted use of motor vehicles on public streets would
be extremely dangerous to life and limb and the prop-
erty of the public. Their use thus becomes a fit subject
for state regulation. Every person who operates or
uses a motor vehicle must be regarded as exercising a
privilege, and not an unrestricted right. It being a
privilege granted by the Legislature, a person enjoying
such privilege must take it subject to all proper re-
strictions.11I1ra
While it appears that the statute is permitted to override
the constitutional provision, the conclusion of the Missouri
case is justifiable. As one writer has put it, the report is
required, by law, to be made for an administrative purpose,
and the duty to make the report applies to a generic class
of acts irrespective of the criminality of any particular act.
The duty thus exists anterior to the whole series of acts
and is independent of the criminality involved in the act.
The testimonial privilege on account of the tendency
toward incrimination is purely personal and can be claimed
only by the accused himself,'44 and the party's counsel may
not, as such, give public warning of the privilege to the ac-
cused,"' but it is highly proper in such a case that the ac-
cused be appraised of his constitutional rights.4 ' Nor is
the judge required to warn the accused of his privilege"
though he may, in his discretion, be permitted to give an
141 Rz Parte Kneedler, 243 Mo. 632, 147 S. E. 983 (1912) ; State V.
Sterrin, 78 N. H. 220, 98 Atl. 482 (1918).
142 Laws of 1911 (Mo.), §12, p. 328.
l7a A question somewhat similar is that of compulsory physical exami-
nation. This, however, is a different one from the question of self-
incrimination.
'44 State v. Lloyd, 152 Wis. 24, 139 N. W. 514 (1913) ; WjIMoRE, §2270;
Ham v. State, 165 Ala. 645, 47 So. 126 (1908); People V. Danziger, 238
Mich. 39, 231 N. W. 448 (1927).
'415 Contra: Clifton v. Granges, 86 Ia. 573, 575, 53 N. W. 316 (1892)
Accord. State v. Pancoast, 5 N. D. 216, 67 N. W. 1052 (1896).
14e State v. Pancoast, supra, u. 145.
147 WirAnToN, CnMNwAL EVIDENCm, 10th ed., p. 974.
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intimation to this effect, 48 or the court may, upon request
by counsel, advise the accused of his privilege. 4 '
Whether or not such a warning from the judge is neces-
sary is questionable. There may have been a time when
the warning was needed; but that was before the days when
the masses became generally informed as to the privilige.
Today the accused is well coached by counsel before his
trial begins. Furthermore, as an eminent writer on the
subject has said: "It is not called for by principle, since
until the witness refuses, it can hardly be said that he is
compelled to answer; nor is it material that he believes
himself compelled, for the court's action, and not the wit-
ness' state of mind, must be the test of compulsion.' If
the accused desires to decline, he should be permitted to ap-
ply to counsel for advice.' The accused, however, has no
control over the right of one jointly charged with him to re-
fuse to testify the accused's trial on the ground of self-
incrimination. 2
The accused is not the sole judge of the possibility that
he is being compelled to testify against himself.' In an
early case"5 4 Marshall, C . J., said that the accused is not
"compellable to disclose a single link in the chain of proof
against him". However, it must appear to the court, from
all the circumstances, that "the danger to be apprehended
must be (is) real and appreciable * * * not a danger of an
imaginary and unsubstantial character * * * so improbable
that no reasonable man would suffer it to influence his
conduct."'
In a recent case.. the Federal Court said, as to a witness
not the accused, that a "witness claiming the privilege be-
148 Janvrim v. Scammon, 29 N. H. 280 (1854).
149 Brown v. State, 108 Miss. 46, 66 So. 288 (1914).
15o WIGmOBE, §2269; Atty. Gen'l v. Radloff, 10 Exch. 84 (1854).
i51 Taylor v. Wood, 2 Edw. Ch. 94 (1883).
1G2 People v. Barnnovich, 16 Cal. App. 427, 117 Pac. 572 (1911).
'53 Commonwealth v. Phoenix Hotel Co., 157 Ky. 180, 162 S. W. 823
(1914) ; People v. Danziger, supra, n. 144; State v. Wood, 134 Atl. 697 (Vt.
1926).
'-4 BU m's TnrAL, 424.
'55 Cockburn, J., in R. v. Boyes, 1 B. & S., 311, 321; See Mitchell, J., in
State v. Thaden, 43 Minn. 253, 255, 45 N. W. 447 (1890); also WIpMon,
§2271 (for citations of American cases on point); People v. Mather, 4
Wend. (Mass.) 229, 21 Am. Dec. 122 (1830).
-8 Russell, et al v. U. S., 12 F. (2d) 683 (1926).
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cause of a tendency of evidence to incriminate him is not
required to show how such incrimination might occur, and
that the action of the trial court in permitting the witness'
refusal to testify was within the permissible exercise of
sound discretion."
At common law, parties to actions and parties in interest
were not permitted to testify. This rule, however, would
seem to have been based on the question of competency
rather than privilege, the evidence of the party being ex-
cluded because he was not regarded competent as a witness,
and not as a protection against self-accusation. It was
thought advisable to remove this disqualification by stat-
ute, and accordingly, in practically all the states,lea a
party to a criminal proceeding may give evidence in his own
behalf."" The statutory provisions merely give the accused
a right to testify and do not make it obligatory, for to do so
would be to contravene the constitutional immunity of self-
crimination."' Generally, it is provided, as legislation of a
second class, that the omission of the accused to testify shall
not operate against him or be in any way considered by the
jury. ' In Iowa, a statute provided it was a misdemeanor
for the prosecuting attorney to make mention of the de-
fendant's failure to testify.' In Ohio, however, the failure
of the accused to testify may be taken into account and may
be made the subject of comment by counsel.' 6'
Under statutes which prevent such comment, the court
should interrupt any counsel who, in his argument, attempts
150a WELARTON'S CRnE. EVIDENCE, 902.
157 W. VA. CODE, Ch. 152, §19: "In any trial or examination * * for
a felony or misdemeanor, the accused shall, at his or her own request (but
not otherwise) be a competent witness * * . See also, COMPILED STATUTES
or U. S., §1465.
158 Tate v. State, 76 Oh. St., 537, 10 Ann. Cas. 949 (1906) ; Also Ohio
Rev. St. 1906, 7286.
1is "But nothing in this section shall be construed as being compulsory
* *, and a failure to make such request shall not create any presumption
against him or her, nor shall any reference be made to nor comment upon
such failure by anyone * * * in the hearing of the jury. W. VA. CODE,
supra, n. 157; Price v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. 393 (1883); State V. Galford,
87 W. Va. 358, 105 S. E. 237 (1920) ; State v. Chisnell, 36 W. Va. 659, 15 S.
E. 412 (1892).
160 COAP. CODE OF IOWA, 1919, §9464.
161 CONSTrrUTIONS, 1851 and 1914, I, 10; PAGE'S A-N. OiIo GEN. CODE,
III, p. 6401.
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to make use of the fact that the witliess had not taken the
witness stand;12 and should clearly state to the jury that
there is no presumption of guilt from the prisoner's claim
of privilege.' Generally not all references to law is pro-
hibited. As one text-writer has put it:
"The true test is, was the reference calculated or in-
tended to direct the attention of the jury to the defend-
ant's neglect to avail himself of his right?"'.'
It should be noted that the West Virginia statute pro-
hibits not only conmnent, but it forbids any reference to the
accused's failure to testify by anyone during the progress of
the trial in the hearing of the jury."" . The validity of this
legislation has been vigorously attacked :105
"But it is argued that the accused cannot suffer by
declining to take the stand, because the court does not
permit the prosecution to comment on the fact, and
instructs the jury that they must not allow it to operate
against him, while in some states the law provides, ex-
pressly, that the failure of the accused to become a wit-
ness shall not prejudice him in any way.
"It may be asked, in reply, whether it is in the courts
or legislatures to prevent the accused's failure to tes-
tify from prejudicing him in the minds of the jury. It
is a fact in the case which the jury have derived from
the infallible evidence of their own senses, and which
must needs force itself on their minds. The failure of
an accused to make an explanation in reply to an extra-
judicial imputation of crime is not only relevant but
strong evidence against him, but how tremendous must
be the effect of his silence on that supreme occasion
which is to decide forever the question of his guilt or
innocence. * * *
"You might as well try to 'bind the sweet influence
of the Pleiades or loose the bands of Orion' as try to
erase from the minds of the jury a material relevant
162 UNDERHILL, p. 140.
163 Parrott v. Commonwealth, 20 Ky. ,. 761, 47 S. W. 452 (1898).
104 UNDERuL, p. 141; Watt v. People, 126 Iil. 9, 18 N. E. 340, 1 L. R.
A. 403 (1888).
164a Supra, n. 157.
165 Wmin. A. Maury, "Validity of Statutes Authorizing the Accused to
Testify," 14 Am. L. REv. 753, 764 (1880).
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fact which has become a part of their consciousness
through the evidence of their own senses * * *. No legis-
lative command, no direction from the bench, can ever
shake the intuitive conviction of men that the opera-
tions of the mind are beyond the control of human law,
and, as a consequence, so long as statutes allowing the
accused to testify exist, so long will innocent men be
coerced to take the stand by the dread of being com-
promitted by their silence."'. 6
But another writer, urging the enactment of an enabling
statute6 7 gives us an example of the other method:
"A judge of New York-no less an historical person-
age than he whom Irving has immortalized as the 'great
Congressman'-was once called on, in the discharge of
his official duties, to sentence a negro slave, owned by
one of his neighbors and whom his honor had known
from boyhood, for some trifing offense. 'Stand up,
Zingo,' said his honor; 'what have you to say why the
sentence of the law should not be pronounced upon
you?' The criminal, frightened out of what little wit
nature had given him, commenced stammering in a
painfully confused manner, 'Why - massa - massa -
Knickerbocker-' 'Not a word, Zingo!' interrupted his
honor, 'not a word!' and sentence was pronounced."
The rule forbids an inference from the accused's prior
failure to testify at a preliminary examination' except
where there is a waiver.'"'
A different conclusion has been reached in some jurisdic-
tions where the accused has not produced evidence. Shaw,
C. J., in Commonwealth v. Wester,l ' 7 said:
"When pretty stringent proof of circumstances is
produced, tending to support the charge, and it is ap-
parent that the accused is so situated that he could
offer evidence of all * * * circumstances * * * and
show, if such was the truth, that the suspicious cir-
166 See State v. Laurence, 57 Me. 581 (1870).
167 Article, "Testimony of Parties in Criminal Prosecution," 5 Aii. L.
REG. (N. S.) 129, 133.
168 State v. Bailey, 54 Ia. 414, 415, 6 N. W. 589 (1880).
1G9 Clarke v. State, 87 Ala. 71, 6 So. 638 (1888).
1v0 5 Cush. (Mass.) 295, 316 (1849).
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cumstances can be accounted for consistently with in-
nocence, and he fails to offer such proof, the natural
conclusion is that the proof, if produced, * 4* * would
tend to sustain the charge. But this is to be cautiously
applied, and only in cases when it is manifest that
proofs are in the power of the accused not accessible to
the production."'
In People v. Gline7' the accused failed to call an alleged
vendor, and the court held that such a failure was open to
inference. If there is a presumption of innocence, so that
the burden of proof is on the prosecuting party, the infer-
ence seems somewhat paradoxical, since he runs the risk of
inference from non-production. 7 ' The inference is pro-
hibited as to the non-production of papers of the accused's
own authorship but is permitted for all other documents
which happen to be within his control but not produced.""
Where evidence that an incriminating document is in the
possession of the accused, the Federal court uniquely held
that no notice of production can be given by the prosecu-
tion, because the claiming of the privilege would permit in-
ferences to be drawn against him.""
There is a conflict of decision upon the question whether
a new trial should be gTanted for a comment upon the
failure of the accused to testify when the prosecuting coun-
sel withdraws his remarks, or the courts exclude them or
instruct the jury that the accused's silence is not a pre-
sumption against him. One court'76 held that so long as
"the state * * * does not directly or covertly comment upon
the failure of the accused to voluntarily become a witness,
the law is not violated.'77 A contrary result is reached in
other jurisdictions."8 It would seem that there is no call
for a stringent rule that a new trial be granted ipso facto
where comment has been improperly made, for "the judge
171 The italics are those of the -writer.
172 83 Cal. 374, 23 Pac. 391 (1890).
173 WIGOO E, §§2485, 2273.
174 See cases cited by WIwoarOE, §2273, n. 3.
175 McKnight v. U. S., 54 C. C. A. 358, 115 Fed. 972 (1902). Wigmorc
criticises this holding in §2273.
176 Clinton v. State, 56 Fla. 57, 47 So. 389, 390 (1908).
177 Frasier v. State, 135 Ind. 38, 34 N. E. 817 (1893); State v. Seely, 92
Iowa 488, 61 N. W. 184 (1894).
178 Anglo v. People, 96 Ill. 209, 36 Am. Rep. 132 (1880).
9
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must be trusted, not only to control counsel, but also to
remedy the effect of his impropriety".'79 The general Ameri-
can view, contrary to the English decisions, is that comment
may not be made even by the judge.
In view of the statutory privilege granted to the accused
to testify should he so desire, the questions arise, first, may
he waive his privilege, and, second, if he has waived his
constitutional right, to what extent is it allowable to cross-
examine the accused.' " Generally speaking, the limitations
have been judge-made.' 8 ' However, a few states at least
have passed statutes on the limits to which the cross exami-
nation may go. The California statute, for example, pro-
vided that when the accused offers
"Himself as a witness, he may be cross-examined by
the counsel for the People as to all matters about
which he -was examined in chief."
The Supreme Court of California has interpreted the stat-
ute to mean that the accused cannot be cross-examined gen-
erally as a witness' 8 2  However, he cannot escape answer-
ing a further question, asked for the purpose of clearing up
what he has already said, because it is foreign to his direct
examination. 8 ' In a California Case, the defendant denied
that he had ever seen the prosecuting witness. The prose-
cuting witness testified that the accused had exhibited to
him a scar from an appendicitis operation; and on cross-
examination the court permitted the accused to be ques-
tioned as to the scar."4  Statutes similar to that of Cali-
fornia have been enacted in Missouri and Oregon.' 5  In
states where there are no statutory regulations on the sub-
ject, the prevailing view is that the defendant may be cross-
179 W!iGoRE, §2272; Robert W. Millair, "The Modernization of Criminal
Procedure," 11 Jour. AM. IN-ST. OF CRu. LAW AND CRItINOLOoY, 344, 351
et seq.
so State v. Luquire, 191 N. C. 79, 132 S. C. 162 (1926) ; Raffel v. U. S.,
46 S. Ct. 566, 271 U. S. 494 (1926).
181 JOHN D. CABEOLL, supra, n. 30.
182 People v. O'Brien, 66 Cal. 602, 6 Pac. 695 (1885).
183 People v. Sutton, 73 Cal. 243, 15 Pac. 86 (1887).
184 People v. Ryan, 250 Pac. 164 (Cal. 1926).
185 15 L. R. A. 669.
10
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examined to the same extent as any other witness. Judge
Cooley in his work ' said:
"These statutes (giving the accused the right to tes-
tify) cannot be so construed as to authorize com-
pulsory process against an accused to compel him to
disclose more than he chooses. If he does so, he is
at liberty to stop at any point he chooses * * * other-
wise the statute must have set aside and overruled the
constitutional maxim which protects an accused
party against being compelled to testify against him-
self and the statutory privilege becomes a snare and a
danger."
A note in a later edition of Judge Cooley's work'87 states:
"Though the foregoing statement * * * is based upon
sound reason, the greater weight of authority, since it
was written, seems to support the rule that where the
accused voluntarily takes the witness stand, he thereby
waives his privilege and becomes subject to the rules
that govern other witnesses * * * 189
This same view has been held by the federal courts. '
An earlier case 9 " held that "whether a cross-examination
must be confined to matters pertinent to the testimony in
chief, or may be extended to the matters in issue, is a ques-
tion of state law, as administered in the courts of the state,
and not of federal law. This right to cross-examine the
accused does not extend beyond a legal cross-examination. 1
It seems to be the general rule that when the defendant
in a criminal case testifies in his own behalf, lie may be dis-
credited on cross-examination by inquiries as to his previous
prosecution for or conviction of crime,' 9 ' in the same man-
186 CONST. LIMITATIONS, 6th ed., 384.
187 Coory's CONST. LIAITATIONS, 8th ed., I, 661.
388 State v. Dillman, 183 Ia. 1147, 168 N. W. 204 (1918); State v. Sim-
mons, 78 Kans. 853, 98 Pac. 277 (1908) ; People v. Owen, 154 Mich. 571, 118
T. W. 590, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 520 (1908); Commonwealth v. Fortier, 258
Mass 98, 155 N. E. 8 (1927); Posten v,. State, 83 Neb. 240, 119 N. W. 520
(1909); Buxton v. State, 11 Okla. Cr. 85, 143 Pac. 58 (1914).
189 Fitzpatrick v. U. S., 178 U. S. 304, 44 L. ed. 1078 (1900).
190 Ex parte Spies, 123 U. S. 131, 31 L. ed. 80 (1887).
191 Harold v. Territory, 18 Okla. 395, 89 Pac. 202, 169 Fed. 47 (1907).
192 State v. Brownlow, 89 Wash. 582; 154 Pac. 1099 (1916).
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ner as any other witness,'" ' and this is true even in the ab-
sence of statutory regulations. "4 Thus, in Denny v. State, '
which was a prosecution for stealing automobile tires, it
was held proper to ask the defendant on cross-examination
whether he was under indictment in the Federal court for
a violation of the liquor law. The court said:
"The control of the cross-examination of witnesses
rests largely in the sound discretion of the trial
court." 96
In Texas a defendant cannot be cross-examined as a wit-
ness with reference to a previous conviction of crime unless
the state is in possession of the evidence with which to sus-
tain the impeaching facts. 9'
When may the accused, after he has taken the stand,
claim his privilege? Apparently the rule differs in the
case of the accused than that which prevails for the ordi-
nary witness. The English view and that which prevails
in some American jurisdictions seems to permit the ordi-
nary witness to claim his privilege at any time during the
cross-examination,'98 but other cases hold that if the privi-
lege is not promptly claimed, it is waived and lost.'99 In
the case of the accused, merely taking the stand as a wit-
ness operates as a waiver."' In the case of State v.
Lloyd, ' °a the Wisconsin court permitted the accused after
he had testified without asserting his privilege, to take ad-
vantage of the immunity as against a further disclosure.
How far does the accused waive his privilege by taking
the stand? There are at least three views:2"°b (1) That he
waives it as to all facts, including those facts which affect
his credibility; (2) that he may nullify the waiver at any
time; (3) that he waives it as to all matters relevant to the
293 Denker v. State, 106 Neb. 779, 184 N. W. 945 (1921).
194 State v. Bowers, 108 Kans. 161, 194 Pac. 650 (1921).
i9s 190 Ind. 76, 129 N. E. 308 (1921).
19a See also State v. Bowers, supra, n. 194.
197 Rosa -. State, 86 Tex. Crim. Rep. 646, 218 S. W. 1056 (1920). See
note, 25 A. L. R. 339.
198 Chesapeake Club v. State, 63 Md. 446 (1885).
199 State v. Weisengoff, 89 W. Va. 279, 109 S. . 707 (1921).
200 Commonwealth v. Nichols, 114 Mass. 285 (1873).
2ooa 152 Wis. 24, 139 N. W. 514 (1913).
200b WiQ xOE, §2276.
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issue, thereby including collateral matters, such as matters
which merely affect his credibility. It should be kept in
mind that when the defendant offers himself as a witness,
he may be examined as to crimes other than the one under
investigation, if the other crimes committed are so related
to, or connected with, the one for which he is on trial that
they may be treated as relevant to it2 1 A reason for the
distinction is this: when the accused takes the stand, he
knows he will be asked questions involving him in crime.
The ordinary witness does not know that he will necessarily
be called upon to criminate himself; and it is, therefore,
not until the ordinary witness begins to criminate himself
that the necessity for claim or waiver arises. It seems
justifiable to require the defendant, when he has testified
to such facts as tend to his establishing his innocence to
continue to answer pertinent and relevant questions relat-
ing to the charge against him, or connected with the testi-
mony he has given. The constitutional safeguard was de-
signed to protect the defendant, so long as he desired to re-
main silent; he must keep all or lose all; he cannot waive
such of his .privilege as suits his interests.
Does a waiver of the privilege at one stage of the pro-
ceeding operate at every other stage thereof? This ques-
tion is affirmatively answered by the Kansas Court, 2 but
a contrary view which seems to be generally followed, was
reached by the Georgia court,"' which considered the sec-
ond trial as de novo investigation. The view of the Kansas
Court is justifiable since it will, in the generality of cases,
tend to promote greater justice. The Massachusetts
Court0 4 has considered the waiver at one trial to become
retractive upon the privilege claimed before the grand jury.
Is a proceeding to punish for a contempt of court a
"criminal case" within the meaning of the constitutional
quaranty, against self-crimination? In the case of In re
Nickel 0  the defendant had been ordered to show cause why
2o JoHN D. CARmoLL, cited supra, n. 30.
202 State v. Simmons, 78 Kans. 852, 98 Pac. 277 (1908).
203 Georgia R. R. Co. v. Lybrend, 99 Ga. 421, 27 S. B. 794 (1896).
204 Commonwealth v. Smith, 163 Mass. 411, 40 N. E. 189 (1895).
205 See an Article by Charles P. Curtis, Jr., and Richard 0. Curtis, "The
Story of a Notion in the Law of Criminal Contempt," 41 HABV. L. Rnv. 51
(Nov., 1927).
13
Boiarksy: The Right of the Accused in a Criminal Case Not to Be Compelled t
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1929
RIGHT OP THE ACCUSED IN A CRIMINAL CASE 139
he should not be punished for contempt of court. Nickell
objected to the answering of questions, and he was com-
mitted to jail for contempt of court. The Supreme Court
of Kansas discharged him on the gTound that the offense
with which he was charged was, in addition to a contempt
of court, a statutory crime. However, the California
court"' in the case of Ex parte Gould reached a decision
that a proceeding for contempt for the violation of an in-
junction in a civil cause is in the nature of a criminal
prosecution, and that the court is not authorized to compel
the defendant to be sworn as a witness in such proceeding,
or to punish him for contempt because of his refusal to
testify, for to do so would be in violation of the constitu-
tional guaranty against self-accusation. While the penal
code of California contains a provision which declares con-
tempt of court to be a misdemeanor," ' the court does not
rely upon the statute, except as declaratory of the common
law.
In O'Neil v. People,"9 counsel for the defendant contended
that as the action against him was based upon his alleged
solicitation of a bribe, the proceeding was in itself criminal
and so a rule requiring him to answer interrogatories was
in violation of the constitutional provision that no person
shall be compelled in a criminal case to give evidence
against himself. The court held that this was not true and
that such an element did not enter into the case. In Kanter
v. Circuit Caurt,2 1 the Illinois court was of the opinion that
"the constitutional exemption from compulsion extends to
all proceedings sanctioned by law". This same court in
another case" has said: "The constitutional provision
that 'no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to
give evidence against himself,' has no application to a con-
tempt proceeding, even though it be of that class which is
considered as criminal in its nature." The United States
200 47 Kans. 734, 28 Pae. 1076 (1892).
207 99 Cal. 360, 33 Pae. 112 (1893).
208 Roy C. Merrick, "The Privilege Against Self-Crimination as to Charges
of Contempt," 14 ILL. L. REV. 181 (1919).
209 113 Il1. App. 195 (1903).
210 108 Il. App. 287 (1903).
211 People v. Seymour, 191 Il. App. 381, 395 (1915).
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Supreme Court has said :212 "In criminal contempts, as in
criminal cases, presumption of innocence obtains. Proof of
guilt must be beyond reasonable doubt and the defendant
may not be compelled to be a witness against himself."
In an early Louisiana case, an attorney was charged with
contempt of court, and lie refused to answer the questions
propounded. The court said:
"The interrogatories in this case were not pro-
pounded for the purpose of compelling the defendant
to give evidence against himself; but to enable him, if
he could, to exculpate himself from the alleged con-tempt.,,)212a
It is necessary to determine the policy of the privilege.
Those who favor the privilege are extremely careful in the
safeguarding of this procedural right, and probably the
time is too far distant to hope for an abrogation of the
privilege. We Americans are meticulous of our constitu-
tional rights and are especially demandant of them when our
backs are to the wall. Individual interests are then placed
above the interests of society. Since our courts are not in
harmony on the interpretation to be given to constitutional
and statutory enactments on the privilege, it is, therefore,
an expectancy that there should be a variance of opinion as
to the soundness of the privilege.
Those who favor it are loud in their commendation of it.
"It confers upon the criminal trial an aspect of dignity,
humanity, and impartiality, which the contrasted inquisi-
torial process is too apt to lack.21 '  Another defender
says 21
"When we see, as we often do, honest disinterested
witnesses betrayed by timidity and embarrassment
into inconsistencies which bring discredit on their tes-
timony, is it going too far to say that the principle
that a man shall not be compelled to testify against
himself is not a dangerous indulgence to crime, but a
barrier wisely erected for the protection of innocence?"
212 Michaelson v. U. S., 286 U. S. 42, 66 (1924).
212a State v. Soule, 8 Rob. 500, 506 (La. 1844).
213 Sm JoHN SAT oND, JUBSPRUDENCE, §175 (1924).
214 MAUBY, W.M. A., n. 165.
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The real objection is that any system of administration
which permits the prosecution to trust habitually to com-
pulsory self-disclosure as a source of proof must itself suf-
fer morally thereby. The inclination develops to rely main-
]y upon such evidence, and to be satisfied with an incom-
plete investigation of the other sources. The exercise of
the power to extract answers begets a forgetfulness of the
just limitations of that power. The simple and peaceful
process of questioning breeds a readiness to resort to bully-
ing and to physical force and torture.21
The privilege was attacked almost a century ago by Ben-
tham in what he called "pretences for exclusion":216 "(2)
The old wonaW''s reason. The essence of this reason is con-
tained in the word 'hard'; 'tis 'hard' upon a man to be ob-
liged to criminate himself. Hard it is upon a man, it must
be confessed, to be obliged to do anything that he does not
like. That he should not much like to do what is meant
by his criminating himself, is natural enough; for what it
leads to is his being punished. But did it ever yet occur
to a man to propose a general abolition of all punishment,
with this hardship for a reason for it? From his own
mouth you will not receive the evidence of the culprit
against him; but in his own hand, or from the mouth of an-
other, you receive it without scruple; so that at bottom, all
this sentimentality resolves itself into neither more nor
less than a predilection-a confirmed and most extensive
predilection, for bad evidence * * *" "(3) The fox-hunter's
reason. This consists in introducing upon the carpet of
legal procedure the idea of 'fairness', in the sense in which
the word is used by sportsmen. The fox is to have fair
chance for his life: he must have (so close is the analogy)
what is called 'law',-leave to run a certain length of way
for the express purpose of giving him a chance for escape.
While under pursuit, he must not be shot: it would be as
'unfair' as convicting him of burglary on a hen-roost in
five minutes' time, in a court of conscience * *.*"
In recent years, consistent with the changing social con-
215 See Commissioners, Criminal Law in the Channel Islands, Second Re-
port, 8 St. Tr. (N. S.) 1127 (1848).
21c Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Pt. IV., c. III, 7 Bowring's
Ed. 451-458 (1843).
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ditions, comes an insistent demand for a change in criminal
procedure. There are those in the legal profession who be-
lieve that it is the faulty administration of criminal law
which is causing a growing disrespect for the law. The
technicalities of the criminal law are chiefly responsible
for the public disapproval. "If the law is a mere game,
neither the players who take part in it nor the public who
witness it, can be expected to yield to its spirit when their
interests are served by evading it.217  When society loses
faith in the ability of the law to punish the guilty, it re-
sorts to lynch law and to vigilance committees, with all at-
tendant evils connected therewith.
"We pride ourselves that'great progress has been made
since the abolition of the trial by battle. But do we not
reproduce most of the essential elements of the wager of
battle in the modern criminal trial? The state and the
defendant are represented by their hired champions while
the accused sits * * * with the truth securely locked in his
breast * * *. The outcome of the trial often depends more
largely upon the intellectual strength and skill of these
hired champions than upon the guilt or innocence of the
accused, just as the result of the old wager of battle was
determined by the physical strength of the contestants
rather than the truth of the charge against the defend-
ant. P218
Laws exist for the protection of society at large against
crimes. The law attempts to make crime unprofitable, and
its methods are prevention and punishment. The criminal
is an enemy to society. He is to be restrained or reformed,
and our laws and procedure must be adapted to accomplish
the extirpation of the criminal classes." 9 Improved pro-
cedure enables the law to grapple with complex facts, and
thus the aspirations of citizens and lawyers are aimed at
an ideal maximum of certainty to ensure public acquiescence
in the justice of the state.220
217 Pound, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AmERICAN BAR AssooIATioN, 1906, Pt. I,
395 ff.
218 E. Ray Stevens, "Archaic Constitutional Provisions Protecting the Ac-
cused ' " 5 JOURN. OF THE AmER. INST. OF C am. LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY, 16, 18.
219 Moorefield Storey, Stone Practical Suggestions as to the Reform of
Criminal Procedure, 4 Id, 495.
220 POLLOCK, A., FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE, 44, 45.
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Does the reason for the privilege exist today?
"In ages past, when the crown or the ruling class had a
tendency to oppress, the care and solicitude for the indi-
vidual charged with crime indicated a leaning toward the
popular welfare tht.t won for the courts the approval of
the people and the commendation of all history. But in
these times, when the state is not a crowned head, nor a
favored class, but when the state is the people and all the
people, to make a fetish of the rights of a criminal as
against the rights of society is a perversion of law and an
encouragement to the tyranny of the lawless and vicious.
* * * All that was intended by the constitutional provision
was that an accused shall be subjected to no form of com-
pulsion. It was never intended as an absolute bar or even
as an impediment to the detection and punishment of
crime." '' Substantiating the theory that the policy never
required the interpretation of the privilege as has been
given it, one eminent jurist said:22 "I am inclined to
think that the expression, 'no person shall be compelled to
testify against himself,' if traced back to its original
source, had reference to a system of torture which did pre-
vail in the time of the early English Kings, and which was
intended to denounce the actual conmpulsion of evi-
dence by physical meaws * * .
The privilege today has ceased to be a protection for the
innocent. For an innocent man, the sooner his defense is
raised the better. The privilege has developed into a means
of escape for the guilty. As has been expressed,224 "if all
the criminals of every class had assembled and formed a
system after their own wishes, is not this rule the very first
which they would have established for their security?" We
have thus given an artificial protection to the accused. We
clothe him with a presumption of innocence; we permit him
silently to watch the legal combat; and we thus turn what
should be a prompt and effectual proceeding to free society
221 E. M. Grossman, Some Reasons for the Growing Disrespect for the
Law, 1911, 1 JoURN. OF THE Alm. INST. OF CRaM. LAW AND CHIMIUNOLOGY, 968,
969.
222 William A. Taft, "The Administration of Criminal Law," 15 YALE L.
J. 1 (1905).
i23 Italics are those of the writer.
224 DUMONT, TuEATISE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, VII, Ch. 11.
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from one who is presumptively dangerous into a race in
which the accused has a long start which the state must
overcome.22 5 The enforcement of the privilege exposes the
prisoner to the inquisition of detectives and to the attend-
ant evils of the infamous third degree.
There have been suggestions that we in America should
revert to the English practice and give judges more power
in the conduct of trials. Those who argue for this reform
contend that the jury and the judge are the only impartial
men in court, and the judge's training should make him
more absolutely impartial, and that to prohibit the judge's
full weight in the decision of the case is to deprive the tri-
bunal of its most valuable element, thus making it less ef-
ficient in the administration of justice.
Even today the privilege against self-incrimination is not
totally granted in Great Britain, for a statute enacted in
1883 expressly provided that in bankruptcy the examination
of the debtor may be taken and may thereafter be used in
evidence in criminal proceedings against him.2"'
It is interesting to note what a French student on crimi-
nal procedure thinks of the Anglo-American system:
"Plainly this inquisitional system is the preferable
one. The principal purpose of the examination is to
give the accused an opportunity to explain himself on
the circumstances which seem to inculpate him * * * .
The accused is nowadays fully informed of all incrimi-
nating circumstances and is assisted by counsel; so
that his examination * * * is now mainly a means of
meeting the charges and exonerating himself if he
can. * * * The scruples of Anglo-American law, which
for the sake of preventing possible abuses forbid ques-
tions to be put to the accused on the trial, are surely
exaggerated.
"* * * the judge (in the inquisitional system) as-
sumes the active part of an inquirer * * and seeks to
extract a confession ** *. But ** the mere con-
fession alone is not treated as enough to call for a
judgment of guilty; the object not being to pass upon
225 MOOBEFRR D STomY, n. 219.
228 Herbert R. Limberg, "Compulsory Self-Incrimination," Amr. PRisom
Ass,., 1913.
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the parties' conduct of their case, but to get at the
facts, the trustworthiness of the admissions must be
established by further inquiry.) 22 7
There is now little danger of convicting and of holding in
confinement an innocent man. With the publicity given to
criminal trials, the rule that a defendant shall be repre-
sented by counsel, the facilities for appeal after verdict, the
scrutiny applied to the record by the appellate courts, the
liberality with which the pardoning power is exercised, the
conviction of innocent men is practically unheard of.
The history of compulsory self-incrimination clearly
shows that the abuse depends upon the conditions under
which it may be invoked against the accused. If we do not
permit the accused to be examined until there has been pre-
sented at least a prima facie proof of his guilt by the au-
thorities after indictment, and if such examination is re-
quired to be held before an impartial judge, with the ac-
cused represented by counsel, it would seem that the
prosecution would thus be compelled to resort in the first
instance to other avenues of evidence, and abuse would be
prevented.
The object of every trial is to ascertain the truth. If
rules of procedure tend toward suppressing the truth or
toward rendering a correct determination of the issue more
uncertain, they are inherently unsound. No injustice will
be done to the defendant in a criminal case by compelling
him to submit to an examination, unless it be unjust to
compel the defendant to tell the truth when the truth shows
him to be guilty. Society and the criminal are at war; and
we must choose between procedural reform to bring out
the truth, and a silent acquiescence in the motto, Long Live
the Criminal.
et de Procedure Penale, 1 JOUR. OF THE Am. INST. OF COIm. LAw AND
CINOLOOGY, 998.
227 R. Garraud, Traite Theorique et Pratique d'Instruction Criminelle
20
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [1929], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol35/iss2/4
